Atheism Everywhere

Article 7: the Federation equivalent of a Bill of Rights

Cyrus Komrik

As promised, I'm going to discuss the Rights of Man as they've come to be understood over several centuries, and how that has influenced Article 7. As a lesson I'd start by noting that we are guided by giants in this area which I list below just to name a few:

Thomas Paine's Rights of Man, which we reference in its extended, French form.

The difference in our approacah to most others was that we felt we were dealing with a challenge that far exceeded the complexity and perils of any before it; that is, global government. The requirement for global government, and our conclusion regarding government of limited soverignty, is predicated on our very first analysis of the problem of government generally where we found external sovereignties to fundamentally preclude attainment of the best approximation of the ideal Republic attainable and to thus be "out of Law" and fundamentally criminal by their nature. This first analysis - our seminal work entitled On General Federalism which most just click past - was the epistemologically prior analysis to everything we've done here. Because of this approach, we were led to the problem not by an a priori assumption which forced us to only understand human rights in the context of thinkers considered precedent exponents to modern ideas of democracy, but to all thought regarding human rights and the social contract. The result has been that our thoughts on human rights has more or less matched that of the modern democractic thinking with some important thematic differences.

These differences stem from a fundamentally invalid assumption, a non sequitir in which one assumes one thing necessarily follows from another when it does not, made by Thomas Paine and others when they were arguing the virtue of democracy. The faulty assumption is simple and easy to identify but has dramatic impact on western thought even today:

It does not necessarily follow that if one selects leaders by heredity that the leaders are hence totalitarian or shall retain or assume unlimited powers, nor does it suggest that the selection of leaders by heredity can't be regulated or nullified entirely by the authority of the people governed, if they so desire, any more than a politician in a democracy can't also be regulated or whose powers can't be nullified. The assumption is obviously puerile and irrational.

But it is understandable. At the time this assumption was first laid in concrete for future generations to assume even more easily and subconsciously, all examples available to these philosophers were of systems in which heredity was part and parcel of totalitarian rule. In other words, heredity followed from totalitarian rule, not the reverse. In those days legitimacy in government was determined by who was the one baddest enough to take the hill, stand there and remain. Period.

They ruled by Right of Conquest, not heredity. They followed Conqeust with heredity BECAUSE THEY COULD.

There was no UN or international law, or some superpower forcing its "civilized", democratic values over the world. Whoever had the biggest stick ruled and, surprise, they handed the reigns of power upon their death to their own descendents. Should we be so surprised?

For this reason, we picked up here by neither favoring nor disfavoring heredity, in and of itself. The reader will see, we hope, the prudence and foresight of this simple and inclusive approach. And that led us to famous debates between people like Paine and Edmund Burke. We quickly realized that folks like Burke were making all the wrong and inappropriate arguments. The virtue in heredity has nothing to do with the supposed superiority of a dynastic elite but rather, in simpler, more pragmatic considerations regarding durability of representative government. And Burke was indeed defending dictators, so there is little we can do to lend credence to his arguments here. So, I'll begin with an open mind regarding the relationship between virtue, liberty and heredity/durability; forming new, more appropriate arguments in response to the likes of Paine, Lock and others. Paine's tortured but archetypal theme can be summarized by a quote from him:

It is a perversion of terms to say that a charter gives rights. It operates by a contrary effect; that of taking rights away. Rights are inherently in all the inhabitants; but charters, by annulling those rights, in the majority, leave the right, by exclusion, in the hands of a few . . . They . . . consequently are instruments of injustice.

Oh boy, here comes LucyAnn. Yes, charters and social contracts take rights away. They must, either they are not contracts. And I agree, there are natural, inalienable rights all have. But here we see one of the most pathological and clinically significant aspects of this view: One cannot exercise natural rights with the safe presumption that a consequence will not follow, even and especially in nature, wherever the rights of others are violated to exercise one's natural rights. There is the problem. If we were all children who believed in the tooth fairy this would all be great, but reality stubbornly intervenes. Rights cannot be had, even natural rights, without responsibility and accountability. And social contracts are not alone in this requirement. So does nature require this in a most brutal fashion. It comes by virtue of reciprocal altruism. An individual who opts for aggression over cooperation is less successful in nature. And alas, that drop in success comes in consequence to a drop in one's right to express those lauded natural rights taken from them precisely by nature itself. This is clever sophistry that appeals to selfish, empathy-less instincts. Ask any competent sociobiologist if you're unsure. Paine goes on;

The fact, therefore, must be that the individuals, themselves, each, in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.

Now, Paine returns to the farm of sanity. He is correct here. It is the authority to govern that is key, not the actual act of governing itself. In essence, he is attempting to establish a fundamental "law" of human nature and of sufficient force to leigitimize a form of rule that cannot, in reality, exist as he imagines.

Locke's tabula rosa is scientific fiction (and is best understood scientifically from a Cartesian perspective), so we shall dispense with that and everything that looks to it as predicate immediately. But we see common themes between the Constitution and Locke's separation of powers (also a common theme with Montesquieu) and with his view regarding the duty of the virtuous to overthrow non-virtuous rule, which duty we aver stands over and above any nationalism, philosophy or idea of government.

Hume and Madison, to the extent they promote the view that rule of law and restraint in it are key to virtue, have special emphasis for us in understanding basic human rights and Individual responsibility, and you will see that reflected in Article 7. But the one distinction of note remains that of the assumptions regarding heredity (although that remains consistent with Montesquieu's view).

Finally, much of what is seen in Article 7 is a direct inspiration from the political philosophers of the American experience in the late 18^th Century, to include Madison and Hamilton.

So, I'll begin with the rights enumerated in Article 7 of the Constitution of the Federation, starting where the fundamental rights are generally understood to begin, that is, Section 5 of Article 7, and have a point by point discussion. Since the Constitution is still in some stages of minor flux at the time I'm writing this, one should refer to the text on the website for the up-to-the-minute version of the Constitution where needed. So, starting with the first Section, Section 5:

§ 7.5.1 Law and Equity under the Federation and within its jurisdiction shall uniformly neither furnish nor disfurnish any particular spiritual or religious perspective or any mutually voluntary communication between two or more Individuals; regardless of sender, recipient or nature of content.

This extends the right elaborated on in the Madison/Hamilton formulation in which it was supposed that government had no proper role in legislation that established a particular religion as a State religion and that legislation restricting free speech should be a power specifically excluded from a Legislature's enumerated powers. We follow this tradition and strengthen it to make it more consistent with the broader religious and cultural landscape at the global scale.

§ 7.5.2 No lawful delegate of the Federation in the execution of Official duties shall act as to furnish nor disfurnish any cause or purpose other than an Official duty and not by necessity or practical gain associated with said Official act.

Again, out of an abundance of concern for the vast diversity and sensibilities likely to be seen on a global scale, we took a broad view of the limitation of State power with regard to any actions an Official might undertake which might result in the use of an Official position to further a possibly very provincial cultural, religious or ideological view or to oppress others with it.

§ 7.6.1 No lawful delegate of the Federation shall trespass, enter upon, or otherwise extract information from within, the habitual place of residence of any Individual for any reason, at any time or under any circumstances notwithstanding any consent or invitation provided by that Individual; except and only as modified in §7.6.2 of this Constitution.

We've added some teeth to the sanctity of the home based on the American experience of applying Madisonian ideas to the same. This has shown both the wisdom and the defects in the extent entry upon a private residence is limited by the U.S. Constitution. There is the unfortunate tendency, as we've seen in the United States, for the State to gravitate toward the private residence as the preferred location of confrontation or enforcement of rule of law to Individuals supposed to be out of Law or Equity in lifestyle, manner or behavior. This is not surprising. It is a classic and predictable power grab by the State as the private resdidence is the focal point of last sovereignty over Individual powers and rights. In the vast majority of cases, confronting Individuals in this venue has been completely unnecessary for the enforcement of rule of law and in many cases has been overtly and obviously inadvisable; all despite the fact that the State has become obsessed with it and the opportunities it affords to disfurnish Individual sovereignty and liberty. If this is repeated at a global level we can predict with confidence that it will result in rebellion against the global authority. Listen to us now, hear us later. So, we've upped the bar to remedy this defect. The Federation simply has no business fooling with an Individual's last sovereignty and we have thus outlawed it outright wherever it doesn't prevent the enforcement of rule of Law; a point addressed next.

§ 7.6.2 Only upon probable cause for entry or trespass, or upon a signed and notarized invitation from an Individual, shall a lawful delegate of the Federation trespass, enter upon, or otherwise extract information from within, the habitual place of residence of that Individual provided; the delegate upon the case of an invitation shall hail to conduct Official business or private affairs, and adding that in such a case no signature or notary of invitation shall be required, or provided; the delegate is committed upon active pursuit of an Individual or Individuals he or she shall, under the exigency, reasonably surmise to be a danger to any other Individual or provided; a court of the proper jurisdiction shall issue an order to protect an Individual who, it is found under oath or affirmation, is presently located therein the residence and in danger of serious injury or death or held against their will or provided; upon conviction in a court of a crime where an Individual is subject to arrest, detention or confinement, a lawful delegate of the Federation enters upon any place whatsoever and wherever that Individual may, at any time, be located, to enforce Rule and Equity in Law the conviction by its existence demands or provided; the overt national security of the Federation will not admit of observing any provisions of this Section or §7.6.1 of this Constitution. And any act to evade justice by exercise of an Individual's sovereignty of abode mentioned supra shall, in all cases, prejudice their guilt in absentia for any crime for which they might be charged.

We start our remedy by eliminating the circus sillines of he said / she said regarding who invited who and the deception often associated with requests to enter a residence by color of authority, despite technically being only a request. This, we have seen in American, generally serves only the State and the Individual's tendency to verbally consent to entry is highly questionable in the face of the color of authority to which it owes its cause. And moreover, examining the Americna experience in the context of a global scenario, it is clear that this American approach would uncomfortably increase the odds of violence, dissent and possible rebellion against "cops" of a completely alien culture and religion. In a nutshell, Christian "cops" need to stay the hell out of muslim homes for obvious reasons, and unless there is some very, very good reason to trespass. In fact, we think retaining and using the term trespass emphasizes our view of both the sovereignty of the habitual place of residence of a free Individual and the sanctity of private property generally. Since the term "trespass" has multiple definitions in common usage, by "trespass" in this context we shall mean it in the definition given by the secondary definition according to the Americna English standard of Webster's; "an encroachment or intrusion".

So the question here really becomes one of necessity. Our thematic approach, and intendend spirit in this fundamental law, is to guarantee the full sovereignty of the free Individual in their most private places without undermining the effective and competent governance required to protect the rights of others using that sovereignty to circumvent rule of law. So, what powers MUST a government have to responsibly ensure that the rights of others are protected when one uses their sovereighnty unjustly as a shield for violating others' rights?

First, anyone can be prosecuted by a court of law and be detained or arrested in due time. The vast majority of people in this world do not remain in their habitual place of residence continuously, in large part because it simply isn't practical. Rather than biasing for a venue of arrests on an Individual's private property, government should be obliged FIRST to exhaust all other venues for the same. So, only in cases where time will not admit of delay does this really become a legitimate issue at all.

Obviously, legitimate national security must prevail sans pareil as that redounds to the protection of the rights of all Individuals. If it is clear and present, that trumps all. Apart from that, exigency could really only fall into three additional categories; that of "hot pursuit" in the commission of rights violations and that of detention, supposedly, against one's will, upon a private property where the free exercise of their rights is suspect, even if only ascertained in exigency itself (an "investigation" should not be required to determine that); and that of a person convicted of a crime where the conviction orders arrest, detention or confinement. So, we specifically grant those exceptions (and as opposed to specifically granting all powers with exceptions for restraint). Once a suspect is held up upon their habitual abode, whatever quarantine or confinement to the same the government needs to establish can be done until the courts have time to intervene. If one fails to appear in a court trial in which they are accused of a crime, it only hurts their case and increases the likelihood of conviction, especially where their habitual place of abode is being used to harbor their fugitive status (tantamount to an admission of guilt of anything for which they may be charged), bringing the safety of others back into play. As far we can see today, there are no other circumstances that would REQUIRE trespass to ensure rule of law. And since any person acting as a fugitive by use of this right is effectively admitting their own guilt, which in turn, gives the courts the right to use force to enforce their conviction.

As we can see, no forced intrusion upon a home, in any general case, is necessary at all.

§ 7.6.3 Only upon probable cause for trespass upon a private property not serving as any habitual place of residence shall any lawful delegate of the Federation enter upon without consent, or otherwise extract information from within without consent, any such private property subject to the jursidiction of the Federation; provided that probable cause is supported upon an oath or affirmation and that, exclusive of all else, the actions to be taken upon entry, things to be examined or observed, or things to be held temporarily by authority as according to Law, are clearly listed thereon.

Here, we are careful to distinguish private property generally with any private property that might act as a habitual place of abode; ensuring that adherence to rule of law sustains even in cases not involving a habitual place of residence.

§ 7.6.4 No lawful delegate of the Federation shall act upon any oath, affirmation, or order of a court, until the Individual or their interest of who is the object of the oath, affirmation or order has the means and time, within a reasonable standard set by Law, to verify its authenticity as having been issued by legitimate authority.

Unfortunately, the sad American experience in "democracy" tells us that additional provisions are needed if people expect to be free, especially under a global government. So-called "no-knock" clauses now in use in America have essentially eliminated one's right to sovereignty over self. We specifically outlaw it here.

§ 7.6.6 No lawful delegate of the Federation may knowingly engage in deception of any Individual when executing any official act by misrepresenting the rules of law, their legal rights, their legal status or any other legal matter unless authorized by an order of the court of proper jurisdiction where the deception is to occur and stating what deception is to be used and providing the investigative or legal necessity for such action.

And here is another specific provision begging for inclusion in the ever more complicated scenarios of global governance. The circus of "democracy" has clearly demonstrated in American history that allowing lawful delegates of the Federation to misrepresent Law places the Individual deceived in a state of no rights at all: If a lawful delegate can lie about what the Law states, and no Individual is presumed under the Law to be an authoritative expert therein, the mere force of legitimacy conveyed by that delegates authority and power of arrest effectively changes the laws for that one person at that moment by a perversion of the principle of estoppel. That is, to declare Law that doesn't exist by one presumed to have the authority to enforce it is no different, for all intents and purposes, than making that Law sans pareil on the spot; similar in nature to the principle of estoppel whereby one establishes Law or contract by patterns of behavior. The Individual is left with a false choice: Comply or not knowing that to not comply is certainly an offense by itself, regardless of the legitimacy of the presenting Law. It is quite the opposite of rule of law and is blatantly absurd, but practiced routinely in America.

§ 7.7.1 Any and all forms of punishment by any lawful delegate of the Federation, to include all forms of Capital punishment or penalties of death, shall not exist in the Federation or any place subject to Its jurisdiction.

Here again, and in the particularly sensitive context of world governance, the issue of necessity waxes prominent. Is the punishment of Individuals necessary to enforce rule of law? The burden, we aver, is on the one making the claim to concusively prove their case. To our knowledge, no one has come close to that. There are theories of deterrence and rehabilitation, but no reasonable certainty can be gleaned from them. It is simply not the burden of the punished Individual to prove that this won't make them a better person or enforce rule of law. When looked at objectively, the very arrogant concept of a "government" punishing the sovereign adults that authorized its existence is absurd. In the abundance of caution and reserve virtue in global governance demands, we specifically outlaw it here.

§ 7.7.2 The right of any Individual to obtain necessity in absolute defense to prejudice bias for life generally, whether acting Officially or privately, to the lives of themselves or their consanguinity shall not be infringed or regulated.

This provision did not appear without some spirited debate. It pits the vigilante against rule of law. The conern leading up to it was that rule of law regarding the right to life of an Individual who is killed is a special case. It is special because once dead, the Individuals' right to legally defend their life is prejudiced against them. The social contract obligates government to, once having called for the signers of the contract to defer to it in matters of common concern - such as public safety - the government in turn attempts the guarantee to reach justice for an Individual deprived of their rights by another. But this can't be done in the case of death as the Individual is denied the right intrinsic in this view to defend themselves in court and appeal to the government to come to their aid in their defense; that is, to render justice in Equity and Law.

Thus, I advanced a "social theory", if you will allow, that One's right to life cannot be contracted as its obligations - central to the very meaning of a social contract - cannot, by their very nature, be fulfilled by a third party. This is a BIG problem that might hide in the walls of the mansions of government at the national level but will come screaming out of the closet at the global scale. Listen to me now, hear me later. Retribution and punishment are meaningless when it comes to the right to attempt the guarantee of another right in a court of law. In the case of death, the victim is effectively denied Equity in Law, for the dead can enjoy no remedy and they are not around to agree to what is a remedy anyway.

But some disagreed on practical grounds. But it is in reality only a semantic issue. They disagreed because they couldn't find the wording and the framework within which to enumerate such a right and properly constrain it at the same time. General federalism solves this. By biasing strongly for rule of law, the right of a simple preference for one's life over another's establishes the basic boundary in rule of law while the circumstances of real events are interpreted in Equity in Law upon that rule of Law boundary point: one can assert this bias provided they don't go so far as to prejudice justice against the one whose life was disfavored.

So, the issue of how to handle the special case of something that cannot be contracted in rule of law alone and admits of no defense when one is dead as a result, is solved by this provision and the overall framework given by the general federalist Constitution. Liberty cannot be contracted solely in rule of law either, but the tortfeasor in such cases will still have to face the Equity in Law forced over them by the victim's ability to defend themselves in court, partly and conspicuously on account of the fact that they are not dead. And it is unjust to the victim to disallow them to perform their own defense.

Recall also that the victims' death would itself be in consequence of tort and justice hence asserts the jurisdiction of Equity in Law over it - which is not possible under the American system today. Thus, the right to life is the one and only right that is guaranteed to supercede, sans pareil, the social contract itself. We've enforced that right here.

§ 7.7.3 Nothing in this Article should be construed to deny any lawful delegate of the Federation, in a manner prescribed by law, the right to confine for any period of time any Individual adjudicated and convicted as a threat to the public safety, to themselves, the Federation or any other protected entity as may be defined by Law.

§ 7.7.4 Nothing in this Article should be construed to make unlawful any acts of physical or psychological harm to an Individual that may present as a minor and reasonable but practically necessary consequence to arrest, detention, confinement, questioning or medical treatment; nor shall injuries or deaths consequent to physical resistance or a presenting threat to authority acting in rule of law be necessarily contrary to this Constitution.

These two provisions follow directly from the Equity in Law that would necessarily issue from §7.7.2. But given the confusion it might cause, we explicitly reinforced Equity in Law here by Rule of Law.

§ 7.8.1 The right of the Individual to be secure and safe in their sexual affections - regardless of their nature - and to privacy in their residences in their sexual, medical and psychological behaviors, features, passions, conditions, beliefs, conscience, and words shall not be infringed; or otherwise held against them in abeyance of certain rights or privileges of Law - by any lawful delegate of the Federation.

§ 7.8.2 The right of the Individual to create a natural family, and to procreate in any biological manner, with anyone of their choosing who consents in free will, without interference, and to, under the law, enjoy the presumption of protections necessary for the maintenance and health of their family, shall not be infringed; excluding the provisions given in § 7.10.3 of this Constitution.

§ 7.8.3 As exception to §7.8.2, the House of the Legislator shall exercise sole power, to specifically exclude individual States, to regulate the number of offspring any one Individual may knowingly produce, but if so regulating for one then for all Individuals in the jurisdiction of the Federation likewise. Notwithstanding this Section, the Federation's power to limit one's count of offspring shall extend to no fewer than two surviving offspring.

§ 7.8.4 The right of the Individual to eschew procreating or partnering free of discrimination for same shall not be infringed. The right of any Individual to consensually utilize means of influencing natural consequences to the sexual act, to include means of preventive birth control, shall not be infringed. The right of any Individual to procreate without a traditional family and with the presumption of the same protections necessary for the maintenance and health of their partner or partners and their consanguinity, shall not be infringed.

§ 7.8.5 The right of the Individual, and of any Individual, to proclaim and bear out a union with any other Individual or Individuals, regardless of their biological capacity to procreate, and to enjoy the same uniform presumption of protections necessary for the maintenance and health of that union in rule of Law in the Federation, shall not be infringed.

§ 7.8.6 The power to establish in Law responsibilities in any declared union or family, upon the one or one's making the union, an exigible of union or family wherever those responsibilities are not modest, reasonable and manifestly and scientifically pertinent to the health and durability of the family or union, shall not exist within the Federation or to any place subject to Its jurisdiction.

§ 7.8.7 The right of any Individual to alter or modify their sex, whether by natural or unnatural means, and without discrimination, and upon the cause of their genuine conscience of gender, shall not be infringed.

We are aware that these rights are quite broad but we feel warranted by our considerations regarding habitual places of residence and the supremacy over Law of the private person. Under global governance, not guaranteeing this right would be disastrous as the sexual and reproductive standards across the globe vary by very wide margins. For example, incestuous relations occur in some 1/7 of the world's population as of 2009. Sexual relations and families, of widely varying partner ages, ethnicities, beliefs, cultures and religions, derived thereof cannot be regulated by the Federation if it is to remain culturally and spiritually neutral, a key requirement of any successful global government. But what can be readily provided for is the defense of a person's rights who might be victimized in these relations, or held to circumstances against their will. The Constitution guarantees protections for such victimization while generally allowing harmless behavior, albeit with the necessity of establishing harm on the one making that claim. Those familiar with the varying cultures across the globe will understand this overall necessity well. And it should be noted that under a Federalist system the State's enjoy the suvereignty to pass their own laws.

If we look closely at these rights room to regulate behaviors to protect the innocent from exploitation or harm (as in the case of minors) are allowed and in fact are likely to appear in the various States according to their own cultural mores. The key word is "regulation" versus "infringed". The difference is that States may not infringe on the basic right, but they can "regulate" it without "infringing" on it to ensure that other rights (such as the right not to be victimized or harmed by another) are not disfurnished. I envision, for example, States such as the former United States passing its own laws to essentially conform to what we see there today regarding these matters. But in countries such as Saudi Arabia, those same regulations may well not exist. This is perfectly consistent with this Article. In neither State are the above rights "infringed" necessarily. It depends on the care with which the law is written, just as we'd expect and desire. For example, if one State finds that sexual contact between a fifty year old woman and a thirteen year-old boy, or more controversial, if that woman is the boy's mother, and it is "harmful" to the boy and that the boy lacks capacity to give consent, that State can pass laws "regulating" the behavior to those behaviors where "harm is demonstrated" qualifier to the relationship. Most Americans would agree that bar would be near impossible to clear. And that would be the case because any culture that abhors the behavior will readily find within its own political culture the will to provide the arguments demonstrating the obvious harm caused. What these rights do is allow States to operate in the traditions they've always had, no more or no less. This is a battle not worth fighting globally just to obtain ratification.

§ 7.9.1 The right of the Individual abiding in Law and Equity to be secure in all their general liberties shall not be infringed.

§ 7.9.2 The right of any Individual to commit any act of commission or omission which does not disfurnish the natural rights of others shall not be infringed or regulated.

§ 7.9.3 All Individuals shall be presumed eligible - without condition - for elected office but for want of talent or virtue.

§ 7.9.4 The Federation shall guarantee to all Individuals in all law and equity the presumption of equal standing under the law and full legal capacity - with all the rights implied or codified in this Constitution - unless and until a feature other than income, assets, gender, religion, conscience, beliefs, age, sexual affections, race or ethnicity is proven and adjudicated by a jury of their peers to qualify them as unequal or lacking capacity under the law.

The reasoning for the above guarantors is basic; general bias for liberty dictates that the path of least intervention is preferable for sufficiency in rule and equity in law. That is then followed with some more variants of that generality. The latter is invoked based upon direct experience with regimes which, hoping to infringe upon the enumerated rights of protected individuals (normally the People generally), changes their legal status to another category vis-Ã -vis their legal standing. These rights are very general and protect against infringements of liberty we haven't thought of here.

§ 7.9.5 The right of the Individual to have and to hold private property shall not be infringed.

§ 7.9.6 The right of the Individual to be free of coercion or undue influence in relinquishing private property to public use, shall not be infringed.

Having a "federal fiduciary" and a "public trust" of what could be vast wealth pretty much demands and requires some explicit protection for private property. Under general federalism, economic equity requires both private and public economic institutions. This is a crucial fundamental of general federalism so I should probably elaborate. Economic equity, by its nature, requires that those seeking an economic relation that does not, in principle, disfurnish rights of others, are afforded the right to engage in that commerce. This includes the commerce of an entrepreneur and his or her relations to the buying public. Thus, economics, by way of Public Trusts, is a valid object of the social contract and exists as a guarantor of economic equity. But it does not follow from that that Public Trusts retain some special, exclusionary status. This is what makes general federalism immediately slip out of the fingers of those who desperately seek to classify or categorize general federalism into an "ism". Trying to describe it as capitalist or socialist, or a hybrid of the two, misses the point entirely. It isn't socialism or capitalism, it is liberty itself. It is a liberty informed and motivated by the virtue of equity in law and economics.

§ 7.9.7 No Individual shall be held to answer for a crime for which they may be detained or lose liberties without first being indicted by a Grand Jury, excepting such cases arising in the Armed Forces of the Federation, nor shall any Individual be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of detention or loss of liberties; nor shall any Individual be compelled in any court case to be a witness against himself or herself, nor be deprived of liberty.

This is a classic Madisonian concept taken almost verbatim from the U.S. Constitution since we accept this general notion as yet another virtuous and valid claim to Individual rights.

§ 7.9.8 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and internal political division wherein the crime shall have been committed, which division shall have been previously ascertained by State law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his or her favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his or her defense.

More classic Madisonian thought taken almost verbatim from the U.S. Constitution. We found this to be necessary and prudent.

§ 7.9.9 No Individual shall be compelled to suffer any economic loss on account of being charged with a crime or misdemeanor in any court of the Federation if they are duly found innocent of the charge that predicated the loss. Any valid loss suffered in such a case shall enjoy full legal remedy and compensation.

Here we attempt to address a problem exposed by the American experience in which a "trick" is used to circumvent rule of law. It has become all too common in the United States for municipalities (in particular but not exclusively) to establish fee schedules for misdemeanors in which particular fees for particular offenses are set to equal the cost expected to legally defend an innocent person of that charge. In this way, a false choice is made against the accused in which they are better off economically to plea guilt and pay the fine since defending themselves would cost at least as much and could still lead to the fee or penalty. It simply doesn't make economic sense to fight the charge and in many cases the accused simply can't afford it. Worse yet, it undermines the cultural mores which support and nurture virtue. Lying about your guilt to save yourself some money makes perfect sense to the individual charged but is disastrous to the society at large if it continues large-scale for any protracted period of time. This is a prominent feature in the cultural decay of virtue in America that we have seen in the last 100 or so years. And after all, courts are all too ready to offer generous payment plans, knowing they will get paid by force of imprisonment (it is not a "debt" but a court order), that lawyers who represent these people cannot offer because any monetary claim they make is a "debt" for which one cannot be imprisoned. If this were some hypothetical, isolated phenomenon it would be one thing, but the American experience has shown it to be a broad pattern of abuse of rule of law. Specific language is introduced here to stop it.

What we are tyring to do with these rights - all of them - is not to force government to be virtuous, but to protect the culture from the erosion of virtue by government action or inaction. We are essentially trying to protect virtue from the avarice of government. This is a key theme throughout the Constitution in which we hold that we cannot legislate virtue, but we can create mechanisms to defend virtue from the LucyAnns who inevitably worm their way into government as the enemies of virtue.

That is the real threat and problem. If virtue is retained in the culture this kind of pattern wouldn't have existed, with or without any particular language in the Constition. It was lack of virtue in the legislators and judges that allowed this criminal behavior to propogate and endure.

§ 7.9.10 In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed the product of the smallest current Federal currency and 10,000, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the Federation, than according to the rules of the common law. In any case, any common law within the Federation or any place subject to Its jurisdiction shall bias initially to be a matter of first impression upon the court, and only secondarily shall precedent wax material.

More classic Madisonian thought taken almost verbatim from the U.S. Constitution. We found this to be necessary and prudent.

§ 7.9.11 No lawful delegate of the Federation shall exercise authority outside that provided by rule of law and equity in law as established as such and as provided in this Constitution.

This is a right of the generalized category, meaning, we seek to preclude government from doing things that undermine virtue and rule of law which we haven't thought of; an inevitable reality.

§ 7.9.12 Neither primogeniture as a practice nor dynastic inheritance of property, rights or privileges not granted Individuals uniformly shall exist within the Federation or any place subject to Its jurisdiction. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to deny the designation of an Individual, if that designation be the only thing inherited, as a member of any House of the Federation as provided in this Constitution.

This could be considered a standard necessity, but is particularly crucial in general federalism so that succession by heredity is not taken to mean more than just that. Our historical experiences shades how we define and think of succession by heredity and could easily bias us to assume it means more than it actually says. Primogeniture and dynastic inheritance has a tendency to bolster these assumptions about, and generally broaden the definition of, heredity, so we specifically exclude those legal concepts here.

§ 7.9.13 Excessive bail for release from confinement shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed.

Another bow to the genius of Madison and Hamilton and what we feel is a necessary and prudent explicit right.

§ 7.10.1 Any act of the Federation requiring discretion shall be fully documented and recorded securely in a manner to be determined by Law. The Senate, once every ten years, shall initiate, and by and with the concurrence of the House of the Judiciary, an examination of these records to recommend to the House of the Legislator that they be made public if it deems proper; which the House of the Legislator may so do by appropriate legislation whereever it sees fit.

§ 7.10.2 Upon disclosure of acts of the Federation deemed discreet to the House of the Judiciary, the House of the Judiciary shall review those records for probable cause of a crime. If probable cause makes, the House of the Judiciary shall establish a special court of discretion - enjoying immunity from public observation - to prosecute the crime.

The American experience is a mother lode of lessons learned. We have found in that experience of the archetypal federalist system (which is what makes America so central in our study as a political/social system in practice) that secrecy on the grounds of national security has produced dangers to, and outright usurpations of, liberty, that we cannot ignore. Thus, we have strengthened accountability by constitutionally mandating the recording of classified acts because it is the "loss" or lack of recording of such acts that has most often been the source of the dangers and usurpations mentioned supra. Most of the problems we have seen in this area stem from the problem of records and the recording and safe keeping of them.

§ 7.11.1 Any form of slavery generally defined as any valuable consideration in speculation of the future performance of a human being, coerced or voluntary, shall not exist within the Federation, or any place subject to Its jurisdiction.

Here is a show-stopper that special interests will NEVER allow to be addressed as far too much money is bound up in violating this right to be free of slavery. We point out the obvious but somehow greatly suppressed observation that slavery has a more fundamental definition and to make Law that is durable, and endures the clever work-arounds LucyAnns will always seek with creativity and passion, we need a more fundamental protection against it. We hold that slavery is in fact any condition in which an investor puts forth assets as an investment whose return depends, in whole or in part, on the speculation of the future performance, and thus future capital gain generated, of and by a human being. In other words, when buying a slave an investor (the owner) is speculating, based on the traits of that slave, a certain return on their investment. Otherwise, they'd have little reason to buy the slave. And that return is a speculation because one cannot predict the future; the slave could die of a disease, be a disciplinary liability, escape or whatever. So, the investor, just as in the stock market, spreads his investment over many stocks (people in the case of slavery) to cover his risk, actuarially knowing that on balance he will almost certainly profit.

But alas, in this view slavery in the United States has existed continuously to the present. It is camouflaged by its kinder, gentler and more abstract forms. Unsecured credit redounds to exactly the definition described above. Credit cards and any other form of unsecured credit are unlawful under the jurisdiction of the Federation and are hence defined as slavery regardless of whether the slave agrees to it or not, or by their behavior creates that relation. No individual shall have the right to be a slave by their own choice or the choices of any investor.

§ 7.11.2 Employment, or status in employment, conditioned upon any act of commission or omission of the employee which manifestly contributes not to the employees legitimate organizational productivity in their role of employment shall not exist within the Federation or any place subject to Its jurisdiction.

§ 7.11.3 No law of the Federation or lawful delegate of the Federation shall prejudice remedy by dint of natural economic acts outside a Individual's control, in whole or part, said Individual's right to Equity in Law, Equity in Economics or General Equity. No Individual shall receive for compensation for services or other work income disproportionate to the productivity said Individual individually applied in that service.

§ 7.11.4 No calculus of individual productivity shall be excessively disparate regardless of Individual productivity. The House of the Fiduciary shall establish by Law one, and only one, dignified and livable minimum standard of compensation for all productive roles public and private, and upon which a sum of that and a metric of Individual productivity may apply to hence redound to an income.

These two provisions were placed in consequence of the Equity in Economics general federalism defines as general equity. a definition original and extended beyond the classic understanding of Equity in Law (see the summary entitled On General Federalism on this website). The provisions establish as an economic right that individuals are entitled by natural right to just compensation in all contracts of employment. Just compensation means only that it follows rule of Law: if for One then for all. Thus, if someone providng a productive input of x is compensated by y, then any other person providing a productive input of x is also entitled to y. The key difference here between this understanding and the Marxist understanding of economics is that general federalism reaches a more general conclusion based on considerations of general equity as opposed to a purely ideological argument.

This more general economic right - as opposed to the specific economic rights espoused by Marxism - simply states that people are entitled to expect compensation based on objective measures of what they have actually contributed to the product or service, that's all.

In contrast to Marxism and similar ideologies, objective measures of productivity will inevitably lead to differences in income and wealth because productivity is highly variable in any population. Let's take the example of a Chief Executive Officer of a mid-sized corporation in comparison to an entry-level employee in the same corporation, or organization. It is presumed by virtue of the role played by a person acting as CEO that his compensation and the compensation of the entry level employee will be considerably different precisely because their productivity is substantially different. This is not due to one being a "better" employee than the other, but simply because the role played by a CEO provides greater opportunity for productivity - the role of CEO is an inherently higher productivity role when competently filled.

This is easy to see when we take a closer look at the meaning of productivity as we intend here. When we speak of productivity we are actually referring more specifically to what is called financial productivity. It is an objective measure of one's contribution to an organization based on that portion of the market value, as the markets determine, attributable to their efforts. As an obvious practical matter, this can't be accurately measured in all roles, but we'll deal with that later. The point here is that, the overall productivity of the organization depends on the efforst of the CEO and all "widgets", m, produced have some market value attributable to the CEO's efforts. But for the entry-level employee who, of his own hand, makes r widgets, where r < m, cannot objectively be said to provide the same level of financial productivity to the organization, especially when r ≪ m. and r is the full extent of the employees contribution. But none of this should be too surprising as we have seen that the greater the responsibility one holds, typically the greater they are paid. What general federalism does is define this at a fundamental level to ensure economic justice can be had through a means similar to classic Equity in Law.

The American experience has shown considerable favor for this view but, having no formal system for general equity, has exposed significant gaps areas of justice involving economic matters. Indeed, the American capitalist system is one in which economic justice is rendered with one hand tied behind the back; only through statutory rule of law, and completely without Equity in Law, does capitalism attempt to render justice in the purely economic realm. Could this introduction of general equity slow an economy, or make a society less wealthy overall? It is possible, but we contend that the natural rights of people supercede concern for material gain.

§ 7.12.1 No Individual shall be denied access to any mental health services for any reason if the service is professionally indicated and is feasible to provide. And any Individual involuntarily separated from employment more than three times due to insufficient productivity shall receive a direct, confidential offer for mental health services without charge or onerous condition from a lawful delegate of the Federation as the House of the Legislator shall provide by law.

We hold that a virtuous government always seeks the betterment of its society and its members. Otherwise, why exist but for exploitation? Mental handicaps of whatever kind are an obligation of the virtuous State to remedy to the degree feasible. And it is not something that anyone else can or will be likely to do because the Individual, by definition, lacks the capacity to act effectively in this regard. And it is a sad reality that most will not perceive the loss of productivity as a result of mental illness as anything worth their own expense to remedy. It can only be effectively addressed by collective action. But perhaps the most important justification for state resources and attention being applied to this problem lies in the simple fact that a virtuous government will always seek to better society and a sick society is by its essence in need of cure.

§ 7.12.2 The House of the Fiduciary shall issue Economic Planning which includes its best efforts to place the unemployed in gainful employment within the Public Trust or a State Trust, or secondarily in the private sector, and to assist new employees in preparing for a new remunerated social role.

This is simply a proper requirement of any Trustee of assets.

§ 7.12.3 The Federation shall provide up to the capacity of the economy as it deems it, financial, employment, medical, mental, quality of life treatments and any other services credibly indicated for the promotion of the good health of a human being for all Individuals in its jurisdiction and no Individual, by reason of want of the finite resources the Federation by law assigns, shall suffer said services in values less than any other Individual who seeks the same.

§ 7.12.4 The Federation shall provide educational services for all Individuals, up to and including the highest standardized degree of education in an Individual's native State, with all resources for operation provided by the Federation. No publicly funded school, college or University of the Federation shall levy any charge to any Individual for any reason; nor shall it deny public access to its records, academic findings, research results and other information favorable to the public good provided the Federation resources required to comply are reasonable in each case.

Again, we hold that a virtuous government always seeks the betterment of its society and its members. Otherwise, why exist but for exploitation?

§ 7.12.5 The Federation shall, before an Individual's naturalization completes or their citizenship by birth in the Federation shall have exceeded twelve years continuously, guarantee and require for and of all such Individuals an impartial, exhaustive education in the standing statutory Code of the Federation, the principles of virtue as understood in general federalism, and the legal processes and principles of this Constitution of the Federation.

Here is another provision intended to nurture virtue. in the American experience we have seen an alarming drop in the publics awareness of civics and politics. This is not healthy. We promote civics with this provisions.

/ WVH

13:56:21 20 December 2009 Sunday

The case for succession of power by heredity

One of the most heterodox aspects of general federalism is its peculiar reliance on heredity. I'm not a PR master but I can clearly see that this issue will be one of our biggest challenges when selling these ideas to a wider audience. We're all drinking the Kool-Aid but I'm not so sure how to package this for the kind of voter whose reading level is below 5^th grade and who has never heard of Limit Laws. So, for those of you into that PR thing I thought I'd lay out a basic explanation of why we think heredity is relevant for global government and general federalism. Maybe you can take this and re-package it?

The first point to emphasize is that we first met with a task that seemed, well, daunting and that would require quite a bit of thought about law and economics in ways we were not accustomed to thinking. It started out as a simple exercise in how to improve upon Hamilton's scheme but, when the unbounded but finite jurisdictional eureka hit everything necessarily went in an entirely new direction. So, I did the first thing any good narcissist would do, I searched the internet for any good body of law and economics theory on global government so I could plagiarize it and call it my own. But most important, I wanted to see what proponents of so-called "world government" were saying about fundamental law. After all, the difficulties of global government are immense, so I was very curious to see what kinds of insights I could get. I was sorely disappointed and even shocked.

The global governance groupies all rally around a more or less common flag. Their views seem to be broadly favorable to world government, democracy and yes, progressive ideology. But to my amazement all the discussion I could find on fundamental law was oddly clumsy and unsophisticated, filled with sophistry and platitudes of ideological origin. And worse yet, there seemed to be a wildly insouciant attitude about how to package their agenda for public consumption and how difficult the task ahead truly is. In short, they seemed to be grossly underestimating the overall intellectual magnitude of the task before them. What they have today in the way of actual, usable ideas for global governance isn't worth the paper it is printed on and should probably be something for primary school students to study and discuss. The thick laying on of ideology you find in some of the "Constitutions" they've written is so unprofessional as to be bizarre. Most of it is pablum and drivel. It was as if the author was, for some reason, insecure about being progressive and felt some mighty urge to prove it explicitly. Anyone reading a Constitution for world government should see prima facie that the ideas being advanced are progressive. So what is going on here?

The most well-known and perhaps oldest operating global government groupie is called the "World Federalist Movement" which operates an arm of the organization in the United States better known as "Citizens for Global Solutions". They've had a large infusion of money from very wealthy philanthropists, have a professional looking website and take the general view that world government simply is not realistic in the near term. Therefore, their goal is to promote movement in that direction in gradual steps focusing mostly on things like the International Criminal Court. There is clearly an attempt at their website to play-down their promotion of world government, focusing more on a bewildering array of ideological and philanthropic causes, most of which are arguably productive pursuits. But in all this I began to smell something not right. What if I advocate strongly for world government?

Wouldn't the WFM want my support, and possibly my membership as well? Moreover, wouldn't they recognize that strong support from all over the world and from highly diverse cultures would be necessary to gain any degree of support for their stated objective, even if in baby steps? If they were really serious about global government wouldn't they have commissioned a serious work on fundamental law, especially considering all the novel issues and features associated with it?

The answer, of course, is "yes". So, let's lay down some background here; a large infusion of money occurred at Citizens and it came from very politically progressive philanthropists. Then the WFM seemed to turn enourmous resources toward current issues involving pure public policy in various parts of the world; the realm of the purely political. None of it had anything to do with global governance. I won't try to presume their motives and don't really care. What I do care about, however, is that they are not our friends and have no interest whatsoever in sound global government. The only interest they seem to have in anything resembling world government is in the current international bodies existing mostly in the Hague, and in increasing their scope and power. So let's call this duck a duck.

Now, in order to take this cause of global governance seriously I think we first have to realize that the idea is not popular. And not just in the United States. In fact, it is far more unpopular outside the United States. The biggest obstacle you will run into is nationalism. But there are many other cultural and social barriers to world government. Obviously, anything global will encompass all extremes of human culture, society, ideology, religion, economics, psychology, etc. In other words, it would be downright silly to talk seriously about world government while ignoring this fact. Anyone promoting these ideas will have to learn some skills, the most important of which is how to talk and behave in a manner that is culturally netural. Christians in the United States have considerable experience in this regard because the faith is common there and the country is wealthy: there exists a staggering number of non-profit organizations dedicated to proselytizing overseas and guess what? They have all come to realize that to persuade someone to your religion requires cultural neutrality. So, the more progressive, missionary driven sub-group of the Christians in America has turned it into a refined art. This choice of exponent is apropos because it mirrors the very situation in which any proponent of world government will find themselves.

Success, not just in convincing others of our cause, but in how we think about the problem legally and economically, will depend absolutely on thinking like these Christian missionaries.

No one will take you seriously if you do not approach them in a culturally familiar manner; hence, no one will ratify turkey shit if you don't take this fact very, very seriously. That leads me to a few bullet points about some of the features of a global government requisite for any chance of overall success:

i. A global government must be more culturally, ideologically and spiritually neutral than its national counterpart.

ii. Rights guaranteed to individuals must be culturally broader and more comprehensive than in a national government.

iii. The government must be rigidly durable to a degree exceeding that required at a national level. Succession of power must be more definitive than we see today in national governments. Even elections aren't sufficiently manifest and certain for application in world government. A different path to consent must be found. Democracy on a global scale will not suffice to address the uniqueness of the problem.

iv. It must be highly resilient to the pratfalls of democracy; namely, it should feel no pressure from faction as it might admit of in a national government. Government must derive its authority from the People. But virtue Government does not draw of the People.

v. It must be perceived in the Laws it generates, and in the Executive actions it takes, to be "of the good" in all cases as the contemporaneous norms of society define "good" and in the generality that pluralism of culture requires. This is called virtue. This is the end of all government. This standard need not be met with this level of completeness at a national level.

vi. To maintain the generality of good required, it must be internally limited in powers and sovereignty - a federalist base form. To wit; it must have shared sovereignties, symmetry (if for one then for all) amongst the States, checks and balances of the various branches, a strong executive, and overall rule of law among other things. And due to the cultural distance between the people, a global government must act with less direct physical contact or force with or against the citizens. Keep in mind that any Official of the Federation may derive of a culture, religion and ideology totally alien to that of a person he is impressing upon in his or her Official duties.

vii. Both the dangers and risks of power usurpation are proportional to the power; it is a maxim of economics and law that as reward increases (power) the risk increases (of usurpation of power) and the justifiable costs (constraints on power, natural or statutory)to mitigate risk also increases. The magnitude of this concern is not as great at the national level as there is less power in play. A global government must contain a systematic, absolute defense against tyranny that does not serve to diminish durability. This guarantees to the literate tyrant that to usurp power will cost the tyrant all power.

viii. Consider the next previous bullet. The decision-makers in a global government would require substantially greater insulation from the pressures of faction. Again, more power in play means greater costs are logically justifiable from a cost-benefits analysis perspective. In other words, the factionalization of the world, and faction's evolution into powerful special interests, would only be ever more accelerated at a global scale. As we've noted elsewhere, this is why democracies lack durability.

ix. A world government would be composed of a vastly more diverse set of ethnicities and cultures; all Law must far exceed the bar of consistency and uniformity usually set at national level lest factional rivalries and controversies overwhelm the government. Bias for rule of law must be stronger than its national counterpart.

All of these qualities we've described for a global government do not presently exist in any national government nor have they in the past as far as we know. We are dealing with a totally new animal and anyone not acknowledging that is either lying to themselves or to everyone else. Not only that, but any advocate of global government who does not perceive the degree of sophistication in law and economics required to make this beast work is not up to the task in the first place. Listen to me now, hear me later. From what we can tell, every movement existing today to promote global government is either far too unsophisticated to be of much use or is a con job having nothing to do with the object of our discussion.

Now, FINALLY, we can address the issue of heredity and democracy - that huge heterodox element that is sure to give us much heartburn. We pick up with bullets three and four renumbering them one and two respectively:

i. The government must be rigidly durable to a degree exceeding that required at a national level. Succession of power must be more definitive than we see today in national governments. Even elections aren't sufficiently manifest and certain for application in world government. A different path to consent must be found. Democracy on a global scale will not suffice to address the uniqueness of the problem.

ii. Consider the next previous bullet [number eight]. The decision-makers in a global government would require substantially greater insulation from the pressures of faction. Again, more power in play means greater costs are logically justifiable from a cost-benefits analysis perspective. In other words, the factionalization of the world, and faction's evolution into powerful special interests, would only be ever more accelerated at a global scale. As we've noted elsewhere, this is why democracies lack durability.

We've discussed in other areas how democracies evolve ultimately to chaos and dysfunction, but putting that problem aside for a second, we have another, more serious problem with democracy. How do you insulate someone from the public without turning them into a tyrant? In other words, we could always elect a president for life, and he or she would be insulated fairly well from the influence of faction, special interests and the public in general. But any summary reading of the three plus terms of Franklin Roosevelt, the President of the United States during the Age of Despots, casts serious doubts on the durability of that country's democracy should Roosevelt have been President for life. Generally speaking, electing someone to a life term does not result in virtue. And even without life terms, any person elected to office is conversely poorly insulated from faction as their special interests likely got this person elected. And, of course, future elections must be thought through as well.

But let's now add two elements to this. First, let's deal with the usurpation problem with a mechanism to guarantee the removal of a despot from power, something I'll cover later. Then our hands are free to fully insulate this person. What's the best way to do that? First, they must indeed hold their position for life being impeached only under very specific conditions. But second, they need to be placed in office without any elections at all - which completely eliminates the influence of faction and special interest. Of course, that raises the secondary problem of how does one choose their leaders in a durable manner that will not lend itself to chaos?

Even elections don't provide much clarity, especially when conducted globally. As has been learned from the American experience, an election result in which the margin of victory is smaller than the margin of error is undefined. I'll keep this concept of margin of error in mind and return to it in a second. In only 250 years of existence this has already happened twice in the United States in Presidential elections alone. While seemingly of minor significance as it affects the certainty of selection of leaders at a national level, in a global government this problem is greatly magnified: holding an election over the entire globe could lead to situations of endless vote contests and irregularity inquiries that could bury the selection process of a leader in quicksand and produce an extremely dangerous situation. Adding to that is that, once gain, the greater the power in play the greater the costs one will likely pay to seize it. It is my contention that durable elections on a global scale are not feasible, even out to the horizon of forseeable future. In other words, I don't see that technological innovation will much improve the situation. It isn't a matter of the precision of the measurement instrument but a problem of the motives of a person making the measurement.

So, back to margins of error. Let's put this in more rigorous terms. As the amount of power in play increases the margin of error in any population-wide election increases geometrically due not to limitations in the measurement instruments but in the motives of the person or persons with the means to influence the taking of the measurement; additionally aggravated by the vulnerabilities that a maximally diverse set of traits in a population - cultural, spiritual, and ideological - will offer to anyone influencing the measurement by virtue of the naturally reduced capacity of the general public to read and comprehend the motives of all those involved. Those who speak the same language and derive of a broadly similar culture as a speaker before them find it far easier to understand the full weight and intent of the message being delivered. They have the natural human 'instinct' of character assessment we all subconsciously apply whether we admit it or not. Those who have spent time overseas and traveled will readily understand what we're talking about. It is very difficult for me to assess my feelings about voting for a particular politician in, say, South Korea because I am so culturally, spiritually and sometimes ideologically distant from them.

Is this solely the fault of my being provincial and not sufficiently enlightened? Not hardly. A cosmopolitan awareness and sensitivity to diversity certainly helps and is to be promoted, but no one will ever be able to switch back and forth between hundreds of vastly different cultures so readily. Those wild with lust for power you can be confident will exploit this. This problem simply doesn't exist at any national level. And it is not a viable option to suggest that we just kill off all diversity and make everyone the same. That is, to me, not ethically acceptable and the histories of peoples around the world deserves protection and preservation to an extent equal under rule of law. In short, I posit that once we take these difficulties seriously and objectively and ponder them it at once becomes clear that global democracy would be disastrous and fail rather quickly. We would anticipate, in all likelihood, a global, representative democracy lasting about 50 years at best. A direct democracy couldn't even hold a single election before it unraveled. This is the biggest difference between what happened in the late 18^th century in America and the global analogue some apply today. The English colonies in America did not have insurmountable cultural, spiritual and ideological differences, to include over 200 broadly spoken languages, with which to contend. Elections there were feasible. But there are many valid comparisons when speaking of the ineffectiveness of Confederations and Treaties and the chaos that exists with multiple full sovereignties. As the world has shrunk, the similarities between the Americna Thirteen colonies, and the problems they faced, do have considerable comparative force to world government today.

So, we ask, what can be done to enhance this durability to a degree that is sufficient at a global level, with all the power it puts on the table for usurpers and tyrants? The answer is heredity with rules of succession in fundamental law that can be validated with the basic sciences (DNA). The succession is very clear and unambiguous and no elections are required. The identification of the next leader becomes systematic, ordered and certain; and immune to faction and the inevitable usurpers seeking to subvert legitimate powers. It is strongly inoculated from any confusion, controversy or manipulation, over and in succession. It is near 100% durable. Of course, we general federalists are inherently put on our heels by the notion of royalty and anything smacking of a diminishment of rule of law - which is what really forms the basis of the problems with aristocracy and royalty. So, while this will work beautifully in giving us durability, is there any way to use it while eliminating the problems that royalty and aristocracy cause?

We belive that we have indeed solved this problem. We have generally consented in our view with Madison and Hamilton - and their descendent followers in federalist thought - of the basic need for checks and blanaces within the organs of government. What many might not realize however is that the checks and blances were not just intended as a check between the organs of government, but a check between faction and genuine overall national interests. Hamilton and Madison spent much time lamenting over the problems of faction in democracy. They knew it was the biggest threat (next to taxation). So, that form we retain as true federalists but we add another federal body. This one is popularly elected and is Constituionally granted certain specific, unilateral powers. Following the concept that the People provide the authority to govern, and the governing persons provide the skill and ability to govern (virtue, we hope), this body acts as an authority oversight power. We call it a Senate for historical reasons going back all the way to the Roman Empire, and we constitute it with powers specifically designed to check aristocracy and royalty, that is, action outside rule of law, with a force and power for which no appeal is possible. Given this enormous power to simply throw families out of power, the Senate is bestowed very few, very specific powers and denied any others. It is simply there to provide the authority of rule by the People. In that sense, once could call general federalism a "role limited democracy". It confines the role of the People to that as an ultimate authority for power but no more.

Only three powers are granted the Senate: the Right of Interdiction, the Right of Arms and the Right of Conquest. All these powers redound specifically and uniquely to "who wears the pants" in this relationship. The Right of Interdiction gives the people unilateral power to override the Official families in any legislation. But, of course, to allow smooth government operation it does require a large majority to exercise. But that is consistent with acting as the ultimate authority source. Large majority requirements serve to keep the People out of the day-to-day affairs of governance and leave it to the professionals. It averts micro-management. Right of Arms reserves all powers in Law for regulation regarding personal, combat arms to the People directly, and denies the Offical families any say in it. Even the military combat arms are under the full authority of the Senate. This ensures that the Senate can actually resist these Official families should it come down to a physical enforcement issue. No hereditary family should have their power lusty paws on guns, we've decided. Finally, the Senate is vested with the Right of Conquest. This is, simply put, a legalized revolt against government where Official families can be impeached and, if they refuse to comply with the Senates findings, can be forcefully removal of these families from power in a manner that keeps rule of law in place and does not require a full blown overthrow of government; a gesture to durability. In this specifically delegated power notion the Senate acts much more like a heavily armed ombudsman between the People and the Official families. The idea is to keep fear boiling in the hearts of the families.

Thus we've surmounted two huge difficulties associated with global government. And we've done so openly and transparently. Despite the Machiavellian disadvantage heredity as a solution might give our cause, we've opted for transparency and honesty in being clear about what it is and why, by straightforward facts, it is necessary, despite the brainwashing pervasive in the Age of Democracy that intrinsically without thought rejects it. This will be necessary if we expect a global government to ultimately be durable. And it can be made virtuous, by and with a Senate. When we use the term virtuous this can be taken as synonymous with rule of law that reflects what the society universally holds as all things good. Curiously, in human culture this is one of the few universals that seem to appear everwhere: everyone has a similar notion of what "good" means, provided we speak of it generally and neutrally enough. So, to fully understand why democracy is in fact not so requisite, notice that anyone ruled by rule of Law they perceive to be "good" has nothing to complain about. They do not feel unrepresented. In fact, they feel very fairly represented amongst their fellow citizens near and far. It is virtue in Law that people seek in social contracts, not "isms" or abstract ideals. Hamilton called this "Justice", though his definition we found to be too restrictive. For Americans we can put it this way. Do you feel more represented in the United States today at the federal level than you would if some magically virtuous force were to rule, passing only those Laws you believed were inherently good for you and everyone, and nothing else? Remember, we're asking YOUR opinion based on what "good" means to YOU. I rest my case. Democracy is illusory and unnecessary for the preservation of freedom, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Ponder this for a while. Now, one of my friends here at the Society needs to package this for public consumption as I acknowledge it is not my best skill. But what I write is nonetheless TRUTH.

The biggest objection I think some will make to this, once they get over their "democracy" hang-up, is that it restrains global government to those acts which only everyone, or most everyone, agrees is "good". This, they may argue, it too limiting. We argue that the one so objecting is presenting the fingerprint of a person without virtue. In other words, is it a bad thing that global government would be so limited in its powers, durably and in pertuity with little or no chance of changing that? I think this is elegant, beautiful and deeply virtuous. There are many good things a global government can do that would be more or less considered universally good in all cultures. Why deny that future? Besides, frankly, we know that the powers vested in these families will stretch a bit to antagonize the Senate to some degree. The Senate will always be naturally disinclined to impeach simply because of the seriousness of the act. In other words, some greater subjectivity will enter into their definition of what good is, but that intrusion will be checked and reasonably limited. It's not as though the Federation would be without useful powers.

So, I've covered the main reasons for heredity and how to make it work, but there are many less salient features of general federalism that play into his as well. The bias in rule of Law means that no member of any Official family will have any powers outside those it passes in Bills which are ultimately enacted in Law (or the usual powers of courts and the President as in the case of the Judiciary and Executive families). No edicts, no random acts of injustice, no notorious affairs to gain more power, etc. This is an important point, but it is precisely lack of rule of Law that characterizes dynastic rule and why we categorically reject that description of general federalism. We shall see, as our bullets required, that general federalism is strongly biased for rule of Law, much more so than any government that has ever existed. What we are proposing simply doesn't fit existing description in the labels we have on the shelf

12:18:31 19 December 2009 Saturday

WVH,

I loved the post on why we chose federalism. And I think you left some of us hanging on your comment about the relationship between bias in rule of law and virtue. So, I'll be bold and take a swing at it here.

First, to understand this connection we have to appreciate the fact that the entire Constitution is really more like by-law in the sense that it serves as an administrative rulebook for leaders. It tells us how the laws created by the leaders will be implemented. But it should not be presented that way, and is not presented that way under the law, so as not to prejudice against the powers defined or controlled by the Constitution. It is still fundamental law, but I'm talking about the way it effectively operates. So, there is a kind of clear division in general federalism between decision-making (vested in the preserved virtue identified unambiguously by indisputable facts of basic science - biology - in the families of each House) and the practical tools used to enforce those decisions. The regnant families are the true Constitution and government while the rule of law is the mechanism in place to carry out and enforce government.

In our parlance we refer to this decision-making power preserved over time as the "Crown of Virtue" and the governing bodies that carry out those decisions faithfully and in full fidelity, the fundamental rule of law. Now properly framed, the relationship is clearer. In order that decisions of the Crown of Virtue are executed both faithfully and in full fidelity to that decision, rule of law must be enforced to an absolute degree. For it is through that fidelity that virtue manifests in all relations between the Federation and the People; to wit, it is through that fidelity that virtue carries fully to each and every person affected by the laws of the Federation. The kind of "rule of law" that exists, in say, the United States, is woefully inadequate for the task. The reasons for this are best given in the introductory executive summary to the Constitution. I should quickly mention that when we speak of rule of law here we are referring to it in all three senses that scholars think of it; the functional, the formal and the substantive sense. So rule of law, generically, has the following traits:

Discretion by individual officials and bureacrats of government is low.

It is prospective in nature, well known, and characterized by generality, equality and certainty.

It, by design or function, intrinsically protects basic human rights.

So, in a system strongly biased in favor of rule of law, we have the following properties:

It proactively censures in law all things not virtuous, ensures that all are very well educated in the laws of the land, affords virtually no discretion in the decisions of government officials to act outside virtue, defines law as the very enforcement of virtue itself such that it, at its deepest level, ensures basic human rights and is characteristically general, equal in equity and certain in meaning. We have come to call this strong bias for rule of law executing virtuous rule to be "Rule of Virtue".

But condensing the ideas, we strengthen rule of law consistent with the definition above in a general federalist system (again, to enhance virtue) in the following ways:

Unrestrained jurisdiction, to allow for the application of justice in all cases.

Passage of law, and preference for rule of law over equity in law, by featuring each law with a relationship to all others based on how general or specific the law in question is relative to the body of law. So, decisions are predictable, consistent and virtuous - rule of law.

Rights of individual liberties specifically enumerated to the People in Article 7 act to impart fidelity of decisions in their most virtuous and balanced form; i.e. all persons are entitled and subject to the outcomes, to the same degree and quality, of virtuous decisions made for all. So, specific outcomes and general decisions have a symmetric relationship. So, decisions are predictable, consistent and virtuous - rule of law.

Law and equity are applied to any natural acts or facts that, by circumstances not fully in one's control, redound to prejudice one's rights negatively; all in consequence to any Nonspecific Performance, Specific Performance or other court ruling consequent to law or equity (a simpler way to say this is that a virtuous decision never acts against itself - which could arise as a result of the fact that a general law cannot be directly applied to a specific situation where natural, uncontrollable factors not considered in the general law come into play). The result of this is that economics, for example, is in fact a legitimate object of the social contract and bias for rule of law requires it to be an integral part of the lawful execution of virtuous decisions.

That's my take.

10:29:22 17 December 2009 Thursday

Ok, I'll dive into the other post now.

The jist of that post was why we chose federalism as our starting point. But this is really a good opportunity to also take up the issue of what exactly the so-called "Houses" of government really are, and why we are relying on consanguinity. This issue ties into our choice of federalism.

This is one of those Kodak moments where you get to hear something known only to the most wise and educated in these mysteries of law and economics. If you've read the introductory constitution page you may already know where I'm going. One of the fastest ways to identify a philosopher to respect is to ask a pozer, for someone planning to solve the great Ideal Republic mystery, what are the key facts we'd like to start with for the best chance of success?

Now, backing up a second, the "Ideal Republic" problem refers to the age-old question of how does a ruler ensure long-term stability in government, the consistent application of prudence, moderation and intellect in decision-making and simultaneously ensure those governed govern themselves. For Alexander Hamilton the answer was to model a government that uniformly and consistently guarantees Justice in civil society. Clever. This works well for him because the U.S. government - which is a Madisonian Federal system - pretty much accomplishes that. Why? Because the very meaning of Justice is socially defined and in Hamilton's day defined almost totally by the upper-class strata of that society. In other words, if I assume 95% of the population vanishes overnight to make the math easier, I have an Ideal Republic in Hamiltonian Federalism. Justice, by definition, requires only that the laws are "properly" applied. "Proper" is defined by equity, here best understood by the maxim "equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy". Now imagine a Judge applying equity in law in 1790 Maryland, a man who with a certainty is of the upper class where things like poverty, hard labor, inequality, racism, etc. are not the kinds of causes for remedy his ilk typically beg for. You see, the very definition of "proper" affects equity which in turn affects the rulings of courts. If everyone who came into the courtroom were of this 5% strata then you would indeed have the Ideal Republic where everyone agrees the decisions are sound and everyone has a voice because it is in reality one voice. But that is a Hamilton digression.

Now, returning to those key facts. Here is the 20 million dollar answer. There is no form of an Ideal Republic because it doesn't exist, not even in hypothetical form.

The Ideal Republic is approximated in proportion to the degree and quality of virtue exercised by its leaders over time.

That cannot be codified; it is cultural. There is no fundamental law, no form of government, no "ism" nor any religion that will bring government within spitting range of the Ideal Republic.

Until now. May I introduce to you my daughter, my lover and my spouse? General Federalism. Hold on, gotta put that crack pipe down. Ok, now, there is an "unless" to think about here. While it could not perfect in rulers that virtue we seek, creating a civil structure whose sole purpose is not to govern, per se, but to attract, promote, stabilize, nurture, and empower in civil service the most virtuous alive might well have potential. It forces us to look very differently at the social contract. Switching lenses now to ask what form of institution could best do this while at the same time providing the structure the virtuous need to rule, we direct you to federalism and thence to general federalism. Notice that thus far we have placed no premium on democracy as a concept or predicate.

If I were all that is virtuous (HaHaHa, TJK thinks so) and I were sole ruler of the world answerable to no one, what institutions would I create to facilitate my rule? As a manager I can immediately see that my biggest problem will be with sycophants and bureaucrats. It takes so many that I need a system that minimizes this complexity to reduce errors, miscommunication and any "falling through the cracks" my orders might suffer. But most important, I don't have near the time to tackle that level of complexity alone. Ah, but of course. Delegate! Great, so I will delegate authority to what I shall call Governors who shall be accountable for specific geographic regions. I'll make sure they, too, have a system of governance working for them. And since I am delegating, I'm not going to think for them. They will need some kind of semi-sovereignty in order to act with initiative and independently. In other words, I'll let them rule but I'll retain the right to override them on some matters. I just have to take care to pick the right guys and gals. Yes, my first requirement shall be that they too be virtuous. Finally, I'll retain whatever experts in law, economics and the like I need to work at all the details of the public policies I will enact.

So far, so good. But I have one remaining problem. The stability of this regime lasts only as long as my life does. "constitutional scholars" call this the problem of durability: the stability of a government over time is directly related, for obvious reasons, to the quality of the system of government overall. There is not much point in all the effort to found a new government only to have it replaced in 50 years or so. But in the case of our virtuous ruler, the problem runs even deeper. For, as the most virtuous of my day, I have no way of ensuring that my successor will also be so virtuous. What I need is a stable environment for virtue to rule indefinitely. And here I shall partake in one of the greatest acts of virtue should I find a solution: I shall relinquish my powers to a better substitute should I find it. And I will to the best of my ability and reasoned prejudice seek a system of rule to transfer my powers that:

Operates as a stable, functioning regime in perpetuity

Retains virtue in rule and all its acts in perpetuity

As long as these two features prevail I know that the best hopes of humankind in the social contract are preserved. The same best hopes can be found in the concept of democracy, which has long sought this same solution. It seeks the preservation of human liberty and the consent of the governed. It purports to accomplish these virtuous ends by popular rule, but as we shall see this is an appealing but misleading conclusion.

In seeking an immortal entity to act as ruler I shall first consider only the kind of rule that can reasonably be expected, barring the most extraordinary circumstances, to exist in perpetuity. Then I shall inquire as to whether virtuousity can be enforced in it. There are essentially two options: it could make as the perpetual will of the people through democracy and will last as long as the people last, ceteris paribus. Or, it could make in a succession of persons identifiably virtuous, in proxima gradu, to me, by some manifestly inarguable deterministic means. The proviso is that, though the actors in virtue may be selected in a stable, deterministic manner, there is still no guarantee that virtue will sustain in them over generations.

The first option has been tried and, we've argued at length, failed. We have discussed the reasons again at length, but the feature of democracy most closely associated with its own undoing is itself: its insistence on trying to represent the People when the People are inherently factional by nature. Thus, the will of the People dissolves to a meaningless character if the People, consequent to the gradual and ultimately excessive factionalizing of society, cannot state what its will is. Suggestions to improve the situation by amending law to prevent faction itself would remove the very character of democracy. This is irrefragable. There is no escaping the fact that durability under such a system cannot attain. Ultimately faction neutralizes rule of law to a condition of null force in law and is committed only to paper. But its biggest omission, as it is practiced today at least, is its lack of any guarantee or assurance of virtue in its statesmen.

The second option is more conjectural and fresh. Though it superficially reminds us of dynastic governance, we shall go to great pains to show that it is, in fact, definitionally very different. And it is not, strictly speaking, democratic as that term is understood today. This idea, as advanced by the hypothetical purely virtuous me, is to ensure its leaders are always virtuous by ensuring that successors favor, to the extent nature allows, me. This can only come by genes and rearing. This suggests rule by virtuous families who pass power to their descendents. But this alone won't suffice. Favoring me is not me, and some means of ensuring a timeless enforcement of virtue in all governance must work in this context.

Let's speak first about where I came from. Where could such a grandly virtuous individual come from, and under what circumstances would he become known to the Senate (this is the elected body that must initially nominate the Houses; more later) and subsequently nominated and confirmed? We submit that this is all chance, and no "ism", junta, religion, or constitution can bring this about in and of itself. The real question is one of identification because nature alone, in her cruel and sometimes capricious random acts, provides these people to us as she sees fit.

And when nature acts, virtue is most outwardly noticeable when a person in the public consciousness endures numerous, historic and colossal moral dilemmas and by that past behavior, has shown in their decisions the quality of virtue. There is no other way to confidently identify it. Past behavior is the best indicator of future behavior. But even when we have that, truly phenomenal people of virtue must leave a trail of equally remarkable past behavior, not just behavior nominally consistent with virtue. We assume of course, that for the purposes of the exercise we've all agreed to our definition of "virtue". And historically we will likely find such conditions only in times of the most dire crises. The most recent such person we've identified, if we can be spared the accusation of being biased, was General George Washington, an officer serving in the Continental Army of the United States in its Rebellion against rule by England. For on 23 December, 1783 at Annapolis Maryland, General Washington victoriously holding uncontested power of sole rule, surrendered his military commission to civilian authority at the State House there in Annapolis at a meeting of the Congress that had so depended on him. Upon handing his sword to the members of Congress, he promptly returned to civilian life. The most virtuous act a person can perform is to relinquish (virtually) unlimited power solely upon reflection of integrity in deeply held principles or spiritual beliefs. This is why I suggest that identifying such people is generally relegated to the greatest of historic crises. Shit like this just doesn't happen every day. Can you imagine William Clinton or George Bush doing this? Come on now, honestly? Of course not. They would immediately begin dissembling and assuming full control.

So, general federalism is a truly unique approach. For it depends on historic circumstances and is not something you can simply enact by conquest and force, even if popularly supported and desired. Allow me to continue explaining. As the uncontested model of virtue, I could suggest that rule be perpetuated in my biological descendents. But clearly, as I've noted, there is no guarantee in those descendents that they will follow my character exactly. Clearly, some mechanism resistant to change over time, and thus highly flexible by its simplicity of construction, must act as the correcting force over generations to ensure rule by the virtuous. There is a clever way to do this. Create a fundamental rule of law enforced in the contemporaneous generation that shall remain virtuous (since I created it) for a limited time after I pass. Note that in the United States this virtuosity quickly fell into quicksand when the populists such as Thomas Jefferson and others turned the federal system from a Hamiltonian variant to a purely populist variant of federalism. This took about 15 years. The rest was history. But suppose that, first, the rule of law itself were more resistant to this change, and second, that it needed to last only as long as the next virtuous ruler could be prepared for the role; say, 12 years at most. Then what we've created is a system that perpetuates virtue in the exercising of the very rule of law we seek to sustain and make durable, not by the durability of the laws themselves, but again by the virtue of those that manage it. In other words, this is not a dynasty because it is not rule by a person, but rule by law. Indeed, it is a special variant of rule by law because it places greater demand on bias for that rule of law to resist the changes during effective interregnums between, not rulers, but holders of legally defined offices.

So, I've identified two key mechanisms for persisting virtue durably over time once an historical crisis identifying this virtue occurs. First, a system of rule of law highly biased in all regards for rule of law; and much more biased than seen today in countries governed by rule of law. More on those details later. The Second mechanism is one that, once virtue is identified, it is one constructed so as to nurture, promote and make persistent the virtue most similar by genes and rearing that preceded it to the parent. That is, the virtue identified by nature and history, not LucyAnn. So, though we cannot legislate virtue, we can intelligently adapt systems to promote it over all else. This is what we as a civilization have failed to do since the beginnings of recorded history.

But back to our point. What we've just created here is, first, a truly federalist style of government as predicate and second, a variant of federalism sufficiently different from its archetype to give it a more distinct designation. We call it general federalism. Most of this difference rests in what we could call the "super bias" for rule of law. This is necessary to facilitate virtuous behavior of leaders, which we shall explain shortly. It also results in leaders chosen not by equal suffrage, as in democracy, but by the historical events aforementioned.

As you read the Constitution (and you shold read the executive introduction first) you will notice that bias for rule of law invokes other hazards that must also be addressed. While most experts downplay the issue of usurpation of power in a global government, we take it quite seriously. Bias in rule of law indicates that a general federalist system must have unbounded jurisdiction. So, a Senate is added to the standard federal mix of a bicarmel legislature with an executive and judicial branch; all acting as equals under fundamental law. The Senate, by extraordinary but very targeted powers, ensures two things; that power is not usurped or disproportionately placed and that rule of law is enforced as the law intends. This is the "check" against the oft-feared perils of "world government".

So, it is a bit longer of an answer than I initially intended but hopefully that explains our choice of archetype in social contracts.

BE, JVH TJK and CF,

After speaking with you guys offline I would like to go over each of my bullets one by one to be sure I've stated this with sufficient clarity and thoroughness; and I invite any suggestions or corrections some of you offered in discussion earlier. I'll start with the first bullet of the first post I wanted to expound upon. I noted that rule of law necessarily requires the following:

§ General jurisdiction geographically not bound by borders or sovereignties

The idea here is best explained by an example. Suppose that 3 countries create 1000 times more carbon emissions each than any other country. And suppose that this carbon emission redounds to tort in any one or any combination of the other countries. In other words, it impacts their citizens negatively and imparts to them a valid legal claim. As it stands today, in order for the world to take action to reduce these emissions in a just and fair manner, the only remedy is treaties and promises. Let history clarify how that has worked out for us. The only way to prevent this problem is by a system of global jurisdiction that can bring all parties under one rule of law to dispense justice. This is what I meant.

§ General jurisdiction in human transaction not bound by ideologies such as Marxism or Capitalism (or any "ism"). Think of the voluntary build-up of a Public Trust to hold assets in common.

This is the same problem but manifesting in a different way. An example: suppose you are pulled over by the police and charged with an offense of which you are, in truth, innocent. Under the basis, but not bias, for rule of law, you are entitled to a defense in court and the court may, as the legislature may direct, impose a fine as a penalty if found guilty. But what happens when the defendant encounters circumstances of sufficient complexity that they will likely lose without professional, legal representation (more common than not)? Remember, it was the State that caused this and it is obligated to dispense justice in the matter. If the economic cost of hiring an attorney exceeds the fine, there is no option left to the defendant, from a perspective of pure logic, but to admit guilt when he is innocent and pay the fine. If you examine fee schedules in the U.S., and the mechanisms for devising them, this is a common trick in democracies to ensure revenue streams for government by creating fines just below what an attorney will likely require for a defense of that charge. Bias for rule of law seeks to make the rendering of equity in law unnecessary by substituting rule of law as needed and wherever it is practicable to do so. While a judge could prudently exercise equity in law and rule in the defendants favor if a defendant brought this defense, it is more likely than not that they won't. Indeed, the defense that pleading guilty when innocent harms the person of plea is a concept over the heads of those lacking virtue and will likely get no traction in a U.S. court. Its mockery of integrity is utterly sickening.

Though it has been well understood by scholars for decades, the fact that law and economics is in fact one subject in the world of political philosophy still seems to get odd stares by the majority. And indeed, western law acts in a manner that assumes economics doesn't even exist. Why? Law is fundamentally about the assignment of value in society. Apropos, and complementing that, economics is about the natural foces that assign value in society. In other words, both are the subject of the assignment of value in society, but law deals with human, or volitious, assignment and economics deals with random, or natural, assignment. This division in disciplines seems harmless until you realize that one cannot assign value outside of economics if one doesn't understand what nature already assigned. Back to the example, if nature assigned a fee schedule common for a particular defense of a particular charge, as charged by the typical attorney in that area, bias for rule of law prevails only if the judge considers that fact as well. This is obvious when viewed from the perspective of equity rendered properly between parties. That is, it is not possible to exact equity in the case of the State versus our hypothetical innocent if the very Specific Performance the judge requires is nullified by a fact of nature. The simple act of being charged renders the inequality of nature the enemy of the accused where otherwise it would not have. Thus the judge is obligated by equity to consider it in rendering justice.

Alexander Hamilton was spot on when he recognized that some natural facts are indeed the legitimate object of the social contract. But we see here that it is not a legitimate object of the social contract in the manner Marxism might suggest. Only where the State acts by commission or omission of an act of authority to prejudice equity in law by the inherent necessity and consequence of a material natural fact does justice fail. It does not fail uniquely because natural facts are natural, and thus not altered by the State in a manner deemed just or consistent with some ideology of economics. This simple yet powerful distinction and deeper understanding of the relation between law and economics has caused more confusion and suffering than just about any one ideological conviction we can think of. Marxism and Capitalism, in all their forms, are predicated on this misunderstanding. Both are fundamentally unjust. It's the kind of subtlety that LucyAnn loves to exploit, for she knows the "masses" will not likely see this finer point. She can create two opposing and divisive religions with one simple confounding theme. This is not a drive-by. We have created a new form which we believe deals appropriately with this problem. It is original and has never been espoused before as far as we know. It certainly has never been tried before. See the Constitution page for an explanation of the solution called "general equity". The term general is used in the same sense as I meant above by suggesting general jurisdiction. General equity is definitionally necessary for bias in rule of law.

§ Equity in law favoring the least complex application of law as enacted to a given circumstance to give said law greater force. This is also a separation of powers issue.

To favor, or bias for, rule of law means that the more general laws enacted by the legislature taken as simply as they can be should, if there be any doubt, prevail in interpretive legal opinion. The reason is obvious. If we don't favor the law itself then we can't say we favor rule of law, for we are rather favoring the rule of something else in disproportionate representation.

§ Fundamental Law (the Constitution) as the predicate of all law, sans pareil.

In order to bias for rule of law, laws must have the legitimacy of The People, the owners and controllers of their government. One generally starts with a most general set of laws which act as the predicate for everything that follows in governance. This set of fundamental laws is ratified by The People. It cannot simply be imposed by an external force else it lacks legitimacy. The ugly truth that any scholar will readily admit or at least admit hesitantly is that this kind of legitimacy only comes by force of The People, whether violent or peaceful. A regnant regime must relinquish State and a new one, of, by and for The People must rise to State. If that fundamental law prescribes a system that conforms to General Federalism, that system must protect general laws from specific applications of those general laws which may creep into generality by legal precedence. The reason is that the more general the law, the closer it is to fundamental law. And fundamental law is the only law legitimized directly by force of The People. A government that does not do this is thus illegitimately representing The People - misrepresenting them. So, the sanctity in fidelity of the general precedes the specific. There is a natural hierarchy in a General Federalist system whereby favor in application of any law reverts to its more general analogue should interpretation be required. This legal principle is unique to General Federalism so let me make it very clear. The actual Constitution has it as:

§ 3.3.4 All courts under the jurisdiction of the Federation, to include the House of the Judiciary, shall initially set aside principles of equity in law by bias instead for substitution by rule of law in the predicate force of any more general law germane to the specific law at hand, as the House of the Legislator saw fit to declare as such and as prescribed in § 1.3.2 of this Constitution, and may restore equity in law should it deem it necessary only upon exhaustion of all such rule of law and their predicates in force; and this practice shall maintain in the House of The Judiciary, in all cases of common law, and in all other courts in the Federation. And the court shall state in its opinion the causes for or against; as the case may be - the substitutions for which it was biased.

And § 1.3.2 referenced supra:

§ 1.3.2 No Bill shall pass either the House of the Legislator or the House of the Fiduciary without each Statutory Law therein qualified with at least one stated, more general legal predicate, such logical ordering subject to review by the House of the Judiciary.

The result is a self-referential body of Code whose ultimate legitimacy one can validate readily and easily all by rule of law with considerably less reference to equity in law. And it takes us one step closer to a more professional, scientific and reproducible means of both applying precedence and documenting the legitimacy of legislation. It is essentially a logical formula for generating precedence. All in all, the obvious theme here is that we hold that the most responsible, competent and truly legitimate governments will always follow the bullets I've laid out here. This term "bias" as read above is a direct observance and acknowledgement of the authority of The People over and above all else. It places a higher bar on rubber-stamping laws which may seem to deviate from fundamental law. That, in turn, affects the kinds of decisions the court can use as precedence in future interpretation (It weeds out bad precedent). Only General Federalism, which has inherently built into it numerous considerations like this for checking the potential excesses of global sovereignty, is custom tailored to the enormous task of world government.

§ The application of State authority consistently and uniformly without exception.

The last bullet point I mentioned was the need for rule of law to be actually implemented. Nothing we have thus far said about rule of law has any meaning if those laws are not enforced both faithfully and in the full fidelity of their intent. This very fact has been yet another corrosive element in democracy that has further restricted its claim to a basis in rule of law. We've seen a lot of humor in this column dealing with the U.S. military and the public policies governing their behavior and methods. But let us look at this problem seriously for a moment to qualify this humor.

Suppose the U.S. decides to send a contingent of combat ready Marines to a place called Da Nang in 1965, the first such deployment to the nation of South Vietnam. As a true story based example of the United States in Vietnam, let us play out how bias in rule of law would work in this scenario. First, laws defining how National Security planners and the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan for such an operation would be laid out long in advance. The best interests of the nation would dominate as the government organs are immune to the undue influence of faction. In that case, the objective would be clearly resolved jointly by National Security planners and Joint Chiefs to consider primarily, how to restore order to South Vietnam, how to prevent re-occurrence of violence within those defined borders and how to deal with any parties fomenting that conflict. Vietnam was a war fomented almost entirely by the Soviet Union and a nationalist named Ho Chi Minh. Due to the requirements of the Kissinger Cold War theory (dark stuff), neither the PRC nor the USSR could be attacked or provoked in this conflict. Definition of provocation for the PRC would include any destabilizing of the North Vietnamese government run by Ho Chi Minh. War materiel necessary for sustaining the conflict was coming to South Vietnam via North Vietnam first and then second by numerous trails running through Laos which skirted the 17^th parallel demilitarized zone established by treaty between North and South Vietnam. By a United Nations treaty Laotian territory was not supposed to be used in this manner for making war.

The correct action was known to all the planners in advance in the U.S. but was not followed because rule of law was undermined. Rule of law mandates that when the armed forces are engaged in conflict they are to inflict the maximum damage to the enemy in the manner most likely to result in the fastest capitulation of the enemy. All other priorites are rescinded. Ironically, the purpose of this is to save lives; U.S., enemy combatants and civilians. Politicans, mostly in the executive branch of government, had multi-faceted agendas conflicting with this rule of law. Had the U.S. Supreme Court had authority to review these actions rule of law would have been favored by biasing to the next more general material law, the law mentioned supra. This would have trumped executive actions. But that mechanism was not in place. Thus rule of law was roughly approximated.

Under a General Federalist system, the general rule of law would prevail. The U.S. military would arrive as the planners competent in their respective fields initially recommended. A large, overwhelming force, instead of one division of Marines, would arrive in South Vietnam as fast as logistical limitations allowed. The population of South Vietnam would be completely ignored. The Army Corps of Engineers would assemble with an attack force including as many armored divisions as could be mustered; all near the 17^th parallel. A private communiquÃ© would have been sent to the PRC and UN indicating that within 12 hours the territory of Laos would be invaded to enforce the UN treaty forbidding use of that territory for war making. In that communiquÃ© it would be made clear that not only will the sovereignty and stability of North Vietnam be insured, the U.S. will make sure nothing deleterious to North Vietnam should occur and all North Vietnamese captured combatants will be repatriated immediately for unlawful entry into Laos. It would be stressed that the purpose of the mission is solely to enforce the UN treaty and that U.S. forces would withdraw at the end of hostilities.

After invading the U.S. would extend the 17^th parallel westward to the Thai border, thus closing the curtain on outside assistance for the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. A swath about 200 meters wide with high concertino fences and minefields, along with fire support bases for interlocking howitzer fire, would be established as the DMZ extension along the 17^th parallel. The Air Force and Navy would provide air cover over the DMZ as well. All tunnels would be destroyed by blasting the swath all the way across with demolitions munitions. The U.S. Navy would draw patrols closer to shore and prevent any vessels from approaching South Vietnam without appropriate searches. The Air Force would lock down the airspace over South Vietnam to all unauthorized aircraft not scheduled for search upon landing. Once the DMZ extension was completed, a residual force for the DMZ would stay and the remaining forces would head to South Vietnam, eventually gearing up to run search and destroy missions to recover all military equipment. Guilt or innocence of the population in collaboration would be completely ignored. Within 6 months South Vietnam's weapons and ammunition supply would dry up to levels too low to make war. Something like 5000 Americans would likely have died with some 200,000 Vietnamese deaths. This compared to 50,000 Americans dead, billions of dollars for a war running 8 years and over 2 million Vietnamese killed demonstrates what happens when rule of law is not followed with prejudice.

Of course, it is just an example to make our point and doesn't in any way reflect my views on public policy; wether they were practical, advisable or prudent or not.

Why Federalism?

TJK,

We talked about our choice of federalism as the vehicle to manage human society justly and effectively. You brought up the point that the real focus in historical defects has disproportionality been on the powers of the executive faculties of regimes. Since we were cut off with life's business, I wanted to respond here and add a little.

So, a fair question to ask is if the choice of a federalist model was arbitrary or deliberate. We can say very clearly that it was indeed deliberate. Here's why. Juxtaposing my last post with the matter of Executive faculties we're addressing here, we can see at once that there is good reason for this historical tendency. Rule of law. The formula is more or less linear and is simple. The more biased a regime is for rule of law the better it performs. The less biased the worse it performs. But what we are witnessing historically is behavior characteristic of multiply weighted functions. Rule of law has a tendency to increase with increasing executive powers and decrease with decreasing executive powers. Unfortunately, the probability of usurpation of power to tyranny has the same positive correlation. Mapping out forms on a spectrum it is easy enough; and I hope agreeable to most scholars, that we can place executive powers on a horizontal axis to compare it to rule of law and probability of power usurpation on the vertical. With values increasing on the chart in the usual way and starting at the origin we can locate direct democracy which fails miserably as the probability of attaining a majority is virtually zero and no rule of law attains at all. A line is then traced from the origin at a more or less 45 degree angle as we move to the right and up, upon which each form can be located. Next we have political confederations which acknowledge by design very little rule of law over their jurisdiction. Then we have the general parliamentary form usually consisting of a weak executive chaired by multiple personalities. Continuing up and to the right we have Madisonian Federalism, a form of federalism relatively weak in executive powers. The energetic executive of Alexander Hamilton is nearby just up and to the right. Somewhere in the range from Madisonian Federalism and up and beyond Hamilton's form we have the various forms of Karl Marx and Frederich Engles. Again, moving up and to the right we have mixed socialism lying somewhere very close to Madisonian federalism (we assume multi-party rule). Next, we have Marxism and continuing we have Marxism-Lenninism. In the upper right corner we have Communism and Theocracy, peas in a pod.

But there is an odd outlier that does not lie on this 45 degree angled line. It rather sits directly on the horizontal line to the far right end. It has no vertical component. This is where we locate the notional Republic of James Madison. It is an ideal that does not exist. And as long as humankind remains fallible, it will likely never exist. This system maintains individual liberties in full fidelity and with no usurpation and is 100% guided by rule of law, sans pareil. The laws are consistently applied, inherently fair and just and are applied uniformly to all. Let's say this in a more fundamental way.

§ Every signer of the social contract knows from the contract itself clearly and with no ambiguity whatsoever what their precise social boundaries are and have full possession of the knowledge of the consequences unto which he or she is guaranteed to suffer - for any type or combination of boundary excess. When a person's boundaries are violated by another, it is either tort or loss or both.

§ Every signer of the social contract is disfurnished by commission of an act of State of legal and ecomomic entitlement in an amount always and exactly equivalent to each of his fellow citizens; no more and no less. All suffer tort in law and economic loss at the hands of the State in perfect equality.

§ Any set of signers of the social contract for whom a relative disparity in tort and/or loss between them is practicably observable, are guaranteed relief by equity in law to a state of relative equivalence of tort and/or loss.

General Federalism is more closely located to the notional Republic, in proximu gradu, than any system ever implemented or devised. So, it is perfectly fair to say that any regime not so located does not favor rule of law. It may be based on it, but that guarantees little.

Moving finally to the object of this post, we chose federalism because of its middling position on the scale aforementioned, suspecting it would be the easiest to mold and/or modify. And I've considered bias for rule of law the first predicate for a global government.

BE,

You asked me to explain what I meant by the relationship between rule of law and equity in law after class last semester. So, I thought this would be a good place to test out my own ideas and see what everyone thinks.

It all started when CF started his rant about copyright law. Basically, the argument goes like this (correct me CF if I don't get this right). If by rule of law I state that it is justifiable homicide to kill someone if a single, controlling event occurs (not likely) such as, "if someone within 20 feet of my person points a firearm in my general direction, I can justifiably kill them", then all that would be needed in court to defend myself is a judge's issuance of something like fieri facis, provided the basic facts (within 20 feet, a real gun and pointed at me) are not contested.

Now, this hypothetical ruling of stating that "if someone within 20 feet of my person points a firearm in my general direction, I can justifiably kill them" is an act of a legislature (a law they would never pass, but it suffices for our purposes here). But fieri facis is an act of a court. When an actual, specific event occurs over which the legislature and said court has jurisdiction, what is actually happening is that rule of law is being applied; that is, the legislature is providing the general ruling while the court is providing the specific ruling. That is, the judge is specializing the general law to make it applicable to a special circumstance.

Reality check: we all know that this isn't how it really works with judges, especially the provincial ones who base their decisions mostly on their own backward and outdated opinions of life gathered from ignorant exchanges on the loading dock with a clique of old, half-dead white guys at Murphy's hardware store and by the few neurons that fire between the first and second bag of Dorito's they're lunching on behind the desk. But this is the concept in Western Law with which they are supposed to abide.

Now, back to the totally imaginary BS of academia. What the judge is doing is called equity in law. I know this may fray some nerves of professors, but that's really what is going on. Equity in law is just the process by which a judge and/or jury takes generic acts of the legislature and specializes them to fit a specific situation. This is necessary because it is impossible for a legislature to write law to cover each and every circumstance that emerges in the vagaries of society. But in the case of fieri facis the judge is actually bypassing equity in law and making no equity judgement at all. He's just stating that the event occurred. Great, so now we can fire all those pompous fat-asses sitting behind those ostentatious benches. Uh, no, because the example we gave is hypothetical. That law won't work. It would have to account for every single scenario involving justifiable homicide. So, what do we do when we need the ability to act confidently in business and social affairs without worrying about having to get a judge's ruling every time we sell lemonade from the front yard, sneeze, jaywalk or bang the neighbor's wife?

Ding, ding. Mr. Edwin Rottingham Contractus legalis, with 400 acres of good bottom land in York county and heir to the legalis fortune, ariving. CF is suggesting that contract law is really a form of fieri facis with foreknowledge. It instills confidence in the parties that their actions are lawful and that they expose limited risk of litigation if honored. But CF is suggesting something more basic than that. What it is really doing is satisfying the requirements of equity in law so central to Western Law. But just as the judge had to know the basic facts of the case and that they were uncontested, one must stipulate in contract those same facts, or conditions explicated in full before any hypothetical event redounding to breach occurs. But this is synonymous with saying that the contract, if agreeable to law, must fully define the object of that which it purports to make contract. Ah, eureka CF shrieks! Any contract whose object is intellectual property is inherently not agreeable to law. Why? Because the object of contract is inherently subjective and cannot, by definition, have an objective definition. So, the object of the contract is not sufficiently well defined to make valuable consideration. Brilliant, but not so fast.

I demur and see this merely as a contractual defect that no one has yet bothered to challenge in court and thus force correction. One could easily fix the definitional problem, for example, by creating an algorithm for, say, Michael Jackson's Thriller which analyzes the binary sequence representing the music and defines the statistical variance in the 0s and 1s which constitutes a definitional boundary. But no one is as anal as CF ... not yet J. I'm sure such a case will come up in the Federal District in California very soon, though. Keep reading the law reviews CF, you could seriously wax famous on this one.

But, what does this have to do with the Federation? It serves as an excellent jumping off point for explaining precisely what we mean when we say that the Federation is biased for rule of law. Beyond the obvious, we first point out that rule of law, in our view, is the amalgam of law as enacted and the equity in law applied to it upon any given circumstance calling for it. But if we favor rule of law, it seems reasonable to us to favor that portion enacted with prejudice since it reflects a more direct representation of The People. That is, equity in law, and any Specific Performance a judge may therefrom issue, is a measure secondary to enactment, not equal or primary, in any representative system that truly favors rule of law.

And all this directly implies that a strong bias for rule of law entails the following:

§ General jurisdiction geographically not bound by borders or sovereignties

§ General jurisdiction in human transaction not bound by ideologies such as Marxism or Capitalism (or any "ism"). Think of the voluntary build-up of a Public Trust to hold assets in common.

§ Equity in law favoring the least complex application of law as enacted to a given circumstance to give said law greater force. This is also a separation of powers issue.

§ Fundamental Law (the Constitution) as the predicate of all law, sans pareil.

§ The application of State authority consistently and uniformly without exception.

This is the legal trademark of the Federation, as one can read from its Constitution. None of this is the case in the United States today. The United States is a society based in rule of law, but not biased for it. And I take this to be a defect in legal predicates.

Atheism Everywhere

07 January 2012

New Blog Address

31 December 2011

The Just King: Rule of Law and Its Proper Fidelity

Now, returning to those key facts. Here is the 20 million dollar answer. There is no form of an Ideal Republic because it doesn't exist, not even in hypothetical form.

The Ideal Republic is approximated in proportion to the degree and quality of virtue exercised by its leaders over time.

That cannot be codified; it is cultural. There is no fundamental law, no form of government, no "ism" nor any religion that will bring government within spitting range of the Ideal Republic.